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THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S PETITION CLAUSE AS AN 
ALTERNATIVE BASIS FOR CHALLENGING VOTER 
INITIATIVES THAT BURDEN THE ENACTMENT OF ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION PROTECTION FOR GAYS, LESBIANS, AND 
BISEXUALS 
KEVIN FRANCIS O’NEILL1 
In the battle for gay, lesbian, and bisexual rights, most of the fighting has 
centered on two sources of constitutional protection:  substantive due process and 
equal protection.  Unfortunately, courts have been reluctant to find in either of those 
constitutional guarantees a broad source of protection for gays, lesbians, and 
bisexuals.2  The purpose of my remarks today is to suggest that the First 
Amendment―specifically, the Petition Clause of the First Amendment3―provides 
an alternative basis for vindicating gay, lesbian, and bisexual rights in certain cases.  
At least in the context of voter initiatives that seek to abolish anti-discrimination 
protection for sexual orientation, the Petition Clause is a promising alternative to 
equal protection and substantive due process. 
The principal reason for invoking the Petition Clause is that the Supreme Court is 
much more receptive these days to First Amendment claims than it is to equal 
protection and substantive due process claims.  As for equal protection, the Court 
does not regard sexual orientation as a suspect classification―so it analyzes claims 
by gays, lesbians, and bisexuals under its least protective standard:  “rational basis” 
review.4  Substantive due process is even less promising.  We have only to remember 
the disaster of Bowers v. Hardwick,5 where the Court contemptuously rejected any 
privacy right in consensual same-gender sex.6  More recently, in the right-to-die 
                                                                
1Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State 
University. 
2See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986) (substantive due process) 
(emphatically rejecting the notion that the fundamental right to privacy identified in the 
Court’s substantive due process precedents extends to same-gender sex); Romer v. Evans, 517 
U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (equal protection) (subjecting equal protection claims by gays, lesbians, 
and bisexuals to the Court’s most deferential standard:  “rational basis” review). 
3The Petition Clause is contained in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which 
provides, in pertinent part: 
Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or 
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances. 
U.S. CONST. amend. I (1791). 
4Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996). 
5478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
6Id. at 190-91. 
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cases,7 the Court displayed an open reluctance to recognize any new categories of 
fundamental rights.8  In First Amendment cases, by contrast, the Court is much more 
receptive to innovative arguments and political minorities.9 
When it comes to anti-gay voter initiatives, the need for an alternative to equal 
protection and substantive due process is especially compelling.  This is made plain 
by the conflicting outcomes of two recent cases―Romer v. Evans10 and Equality 
Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati11―which both involved 
voter initiatives that abolished anti-discrimination protection for gays, lesbians, and 
bisexuals.  Except for their scope (Romer involved a state-wide referendum, while 
Cincinnati featured a local election), the initiatives in these two cases were virtually 
identical.  And yet they produced opposite results.  Applying “rational basis” 
review,12 the Supreme Court struck down the Romer initiative.13  Employing the 
same deferential standard,14 and straining to distinguish the Romer facts,15 the Sixth 
Circuit upheld the Cincinnati initiative.16  But the Sixth Circuit did not so much 
distinguish Romer as read into the Cincinnati initiative a benign effect (one that the 
                                                                
7In Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) and in Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 
(1997), the Supreme Court rejected, respectively, a substantive due process and an equal 
protection challenge to state statutes criminalizing assisted suicide. 
8Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21 (emphatically confining substantive due process to “those 
fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history 
and tradition’”) (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)). 
9See, e.g., Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999) 
(stressing the First Amendment value of uninhibited communication with voters, the Court 
strikes down Colorado’s restrictions on the procedure for getting initiatives on the ballot) 
(among the restrictions invalidated were requirements that people circulating petitions be 
registered Colorado voters and wear badges identifying themselves by name); City of Chicago 
v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (invoking the First Amendment vagueness doctrine to strike 
down an anti-loitering ordinance aimed at preventing gang members from controlling 
neighborhood streets); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (striking down the 
Communications Decency Act, a federal statute that criminalized the on-line display of 
“indecent” materials to minors) (holding that the Internet, unlike broadcast media, enjoys the 
same unqualified protection afforded the print media); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of 
Western New York, 519 U.S. 357 (1997) (striking down an injunction that imposed a “floating 
buffer zone,” requiring pro-life protesters to stay 15 feet from those entering or leaving an 
abortion clinic); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (striking down 
a ban on anonymous leafletting); City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994) (striking down 
local ordinance whose enforcement barred a homeowner from displaying on her property a 
sign that opposed U.S. intervention in the Persian Gulf). 
10517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
11128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 943 (1998). 
12517 U.S. at 631. 
13Id. at 635-36. 
14128 F.3d at 293. 
15Id. at 294-97. 
16Id. at 301. 
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Supreme Court dissenters had no trouble finding in Romer17 as well):  namely, 
Cincinnatians were merely “eliminat[ing] ‘special class status’ and ‘preferential 
treatment’ for gays as gays.”18 
What is to stop other municipalities from following Cincinnati’s lead?  What is to 
stop other homophobes from rallying around Cincinnati’s “special rights” 
accusation?  What is to stop other judges, hostile to Romer’s result, from echoing 
Cincinnati’s analysis?  Since, after all, Romer requires the application of “rational 
basis” review19―a standard that invites a rubber-stamped approval of the challenged 
action―what is to prevent Romer’s result from becoming the exception rather than 
the rule?  There is only one answer to these questions:  Resort to a constitutional 
provision other than the Equal Protection Clause.  Enter the Petition Clause. 
The First Amendment provides, in pertinent part: 
Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.20 
By its terms, the Petition Clause is implicated by voter initiatives that strip a political 
minority of anti-discrimination protection and place special obstacles in the path of 
that minority should it ever seek to restore the protection it has lost. 
This was exactly the effect of the Cincinnati initiative―and, as part of the 
litigation team at the district court level in that case, I drafted a Petition Clause 
argument that found its way into our brief.  In granting us an injunction that blocked 
the initiative from taking effect, the district judge embraced my argument, holding 
that the First Amendment afforded a distinct basis for striking the initiative down.21  
On appeal, the plaintiffs relied exclusively on the Equal Protection Clause.  Thus, the 
Petition Clause argument proved successful the only time it was employed. 
That argument proceeded as follows:  The Cincinnati initiative makes it 
impossible to enact anti-discrimination legislation for gays, lesbians, and bisexuals 
through normal lobbying of city council and normal majority vote.  One must amend 
the city charter to restore such protection.22  Under the Ohio Constitution,23 there are 
only two ways to amend a municipal charter:  (1) obtain a two-thirds vote by city 
council; or (2) present city council with a petition signed by ten percent of the 
                                                                
17517 U.S. at 638 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The amendment prohibits special treatment of 
homosexuals, and nothing more.”).  Justice Kennedy, writing for the Romer majority, flatly 
rejected this assertion.  Id. at 631. 
18128 F.3d at 297. 
19517 U.S. at 631. 
20U.S. CONST. amend. I (1791). 
21Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 
444-47 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev’d on other grounds, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 
judgment vacated, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996), on remand, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997) (rejecting 
equal protection challenge to the Cincinnati initiative, distinguishing Romer v. Evans, 517 
U.S. 620 (1996)), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 943 (1998). 
22860 F. Supp. at 445. 
23OHIO CONST., art. XVIII, § 9. 
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electorate.  Thus, to restore the anti-discrimination protections they have lost, gays, 
lesbians, and bisexuals are confronted by special burdens faced by no other political 
minority.  They must leap through one of two hoops of flame:  Go and get a super 
majority in city council, or hit the streets and gather signatures from ten percent of 
the electorate.  Compounding these burdens are two additional problems.  First, the 
Cincinnati initiative appears by its terms to prohibit the first option (seeking a super 
majority in city council).24  Second, gays, lesbians, and bisexuals who take to the 
street to collect the requisite signatures are all the while stripped of anti-
discrimination protection in housing and employment―exposing them to retaliation 
and thus chilling their speech.25   
By singling out one political minority, abolishing its anti-discrimination 
protection, and then saddling it with heightened electoral burdens should it ever seek 
to restore those protections, the Cincinnati initiative left gays, lesbians, and bisexuals 
at a special disadvantage in lobbying their government for desired legislation.  This, 
held the district court, was a violation of the Petition Clause.26 
What, finally, do we know about the Petition Clause?  Though it has generated 
scant attention from lawyers and judges, the right to petition has an ancient 
lineage―traceable all the way back to Magna Carta (1215)27 ―and was firmly 
rooted in the American colonies by the time of the Revolution.28  Indeed, 50 years 
before the First Amendment’s adoption, the colonial assemblies were already 
treating the right to petition as deserving of the greatest protection.29  The few 
scholars who have looked at this history assert that the right to petition originated 
and developed separately from the other expressive freedoms (speech, press, and 
assembly);30 that it was treated as superior to those other freedoms;31 and that it was 
subject to much fewer restrictions than those other freedoms.32  In 1680―when 
constructive treason,33 licensing,34 and seditious libel35 effected ferocious restrictions 
on speech and press―the English Parliament adopted resolutions singling out the 
                                                                
24Equality Foundation, 860 F. Supp. at 447. 
25Id. at 446, 447. 
26Id. at 444-47. 
27Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition Government for a Redress of 
Grievances:  Cut from a Different Cloth, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15, 22 (1993); Norman B. 
Smith, “Shall Make No Law Abridging. . .”:  An Analysis of the Neglected, but Nearly 
Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1153, 1155 (1986). 
28Spanbauer, supra note 27, at 28; Smith, supra note 27, at 1170-75. 
29Spanbauer, supra note 27, at 20. 
30Spanbauer, supra note 27, at 17; Smith, supra note 27, at 1168-69. 
31Spanbauer, supra note 27, at 17; Smith, supra note 27, at 1167-69. 
32Spanbauer, supra note 27, at 17; Smith, supra note 27, at 1153-54. 
33LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 9 (1985); FREDRICK SEATON SIEBERT, 
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND 265-68 (1952). 
34LEVY, supra note 33, at 6, 12; SIEBERT, supra note 33, at 260-63. 
35LEVY, supra note 33, at 11; SIEBERT, supra note 33, at 271. 
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right to petition as an ancient privilege and expelling certain members for attempting 
to thwart its exercise by the citizenry.36  Thus, the Petition Clause embodies a right 
whose lineage appears longer and stronger than that of the great freedoms of speech 
and press. 
Seemingly unaware of this lineage, the Supreme Court has described the Petition 
Clause as “cut from the same cloth” as the other First Amendment freedoms.37  
Though this may be historically inaccurate, it nevertheless bodes well for Petition 
Clause claimants, who can expect a heightened scrutiny comparable to that reserved 
for other First Amendment claims.  Indeed, the Court has expressly held that 
“‘statutes . . . limit[ing] the power of the people to initiate legislation are to be 
closely scrutinized and narrowly construed.’”38 
Let me conclude my remarks simply by recalling my original purpose in making 
them.  My objective here was merely to plant a seed:  to identify an alternative basis 
for vindicating the rights of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals―especially when 
combatting homophobic voter initiatives like those in Romer and Cincinnati.  It’s my 
hope that―confronted by the new wave of voter initiatives that will likely follow in 
Cincinnati’s wake―the Petition Clause will serve as a useful tool in fighting efforts 
to cripple the ability of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals to enact or restore anti-
discrimination protection. 
                                                                
36Smith, supra note 27, at 1160 (citing 4 Parl. Hist. Eng. 1174 (1700)).  These resolutions 
stated that “it is and ever hath been the undoubted right of the subjects of England to petition 
the King for the calling and sitting of Parliament and the redressing of grievances,” and, 
further, that “to traduce such petitioning as a violation of duty, and to represent it to his 
majesty as tumultuous and seditious is to betray the liberty of the subject, and contribute to the 
design of subverting the ancient legal constitution of this kingdom, and introducing arbitrary 
power.”  Id. 
37McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985). 
38Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420 (1988) (quoting Urevich v. Woodard, 667 P.2d 760, 
763 (Colo. 1983)). 
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